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The equity premium puzzle, first documented by Mehra and Prescott, refers to the empirical fact
that stocks have greatly outperformed bonds over the last century. As Mehra and Prescott point
out, it appears difficult to explain the magnitude of the equity premium within the usual
economics paradigm because the level of risk aversion necessary to justify such a large premium
is implausibly large. We offer a new explanation based on Kahneman and Tversky's prospect
theory'. The explanation has two components. First, investors are assumed to be 'loss averse
meaning they are distinctly more sensitive to losses than to gains. Second, investors are assumed
to evaluate their portfolios frequently, even if they have long-term investment goals such as
saving for retirement or managing a pension plan. We dub this combination 'myopic loss
aversion'. Using simulations we find that the size of the equity premium is consistent with the
previously estimated parameters of prospect theory if investors evaluate their portfolios annually.
That is, investors appear to choose portfolios Jf they were operating with a time horizon of
about one year. The same approach is then used to study the size effect. Preliminary results
suggest that myopic loss aversion may also have some explanatory power for this anomaly.
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There is an enormous discrepancy between the returns on stocks and
fixed income securities. Since 1926, the annual real return on stocks has been
about 7 percent while the real return on treasury bills has been less than 1
percent. As demonstrated by Mehra and Prescott (1985), this difference is too
large to be explained by investor risk aversion. That is, the level of risk aversion
necessary to explain the historical equity premium is too large to be plausible.
Mehra and Prescott estimate that investors would have to have coefficients of
relative risk aversion in excess of 30 to explain the historical equity premium,
whereas previous estimates and theoretical arguments suggest that the actual
figure is close to 1.0. We are left with a pair of questions: why is the equity
premium so large? or, why is anyone willing to hold bonds?
The answer we propose in this paper is based on two concepts from the
psychology of decision making. The first concept is loss aversion. Loss aversion
refers to the tendency for individuals to be more sensitive to reductions in their
levels of well being than to increases. The concept plays a central role in Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky's (1979) descriptive theory of decision making
under uncertainly, prospect theory.1 Empirical estimates of loss aversion are
typically in the neighborhood of 2, meaning the disutility of giving something up is
twice as great as the utility of acquiring it (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992;
Kahneman, Krietsch and Thaler, 1990).
The second behavioral concept we employ is mental accounting
(Kahrieman and Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1985). Mental accounting refers to the
implicit methods individuals use to code and evaluate financial outcomes:
1 The notion that people treat gains and losses has a long tradition. For example, Swalrn (1966)
noted this phenomenon In a study of managerial decision making. See Libby and Fishburn
(1977) for other early references.
2transactions, investments, gambles, etc. The aspect of mental accounting that
plays a particularly important role in this research is the aggregation rules people
follow. Aggregation rules are applied along two dimensions: cross-sectionally
and intertemporally. For example, an investor who hold shares in several
companies might evaluate her portfolio stock by stock or as an aggregate; and
might do this monthly, annually, or every decade. Because of the presence of
loss aversion, these aggregation rules are not neutral. This point can best be
illustrated by example.
Consider the problem first posed by Paul Samuelson (1963). Samuelson
asked a colleague whether he would be willing to accept the following bet: a
50% chance to win $200 and a 50% chance to lose $100. The colleague turned
this bet down, but announced that he was happy to accept 100 such bets. This
exchange provoked Samuelson into proving a theorem showing that his
colleague was irrationaL2 Of more interest here is what the colleague offered as
his rationale for turning down the bet: "I wont bet because I would feel the $100
loss more than the $200 gain.' This sentiment is the intuition behind the concept
of loss aversion. One simple utility function that would capture this notion is the
following:
U(x) = x x￿0
2.5x x<0
The role of mental accounting is illustrated by noting that if Samuelsons
colleague had this utility function he would turn down one bet but accept two or
2 Specifically, the theorem says that if someone is unwilling to accept a single play of a bet at
any wealth level that could occur over the course of some number of repetitions of the bet (in this
case, the relevant range is the colleagues current wealth plus $20,000 to current wealth minus
$10,000) then accepting the multiple bet is inconsistent with expected utility theory. Bar Hillel and
Tversky [19831 prove a more general result. Namely, for the same set of conditions they show
that accepting the series of bets but declining the single bet constitutes a violation of dominance.
Also, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) argue that a more general principle, called proper risk
aversion, has normative appeal. If someone is properly risk averse, then if he rejects the single
bet at his current wealth level he will also decline the series of bets.
3more as long as he didn't have to watch the bet being played out. The
distribution of outcomes created by the portfolio of two bets {$400, .25; 100, .50;
-$200, .25) yields positive expected utility with the hypothesized utility function,
though of course simple repetitions of the single bet are unattractive if evaluated
one at a time. As this example illustrates, when decision makers are loss averse,
they will be more willing to take risks if they evaluate their performance (or have
their performance evaluated) infrequently.
The relevance of this argument to the equity premium puzzle can be seen
by considering the problem facing an investor with the utility function defined
above. Suppose the investor must choose between a risky asset that pays an
expected 8 percent per year with a standard deviation of 20 percent (like stocks)
and a safe asset which pays a sure 1 percent. By the same logic that applied to
Samuelson's colleague, the attractiveness of the risky asset will depend on the
time horizon of the investor. The longer the investor intends to hold the asset,
the more attractive the risky asset will appear, as long the investment is not
evaluated frequently. Put another way, two factors contribute to an investor
being unwilling to bear the risks associated with holding equities, loss aversion
and a short evaluation period. We refer to this combination as myooic loss
aversion,
Can myopic loss aversion explain the equity premium puzzle? Of course,
there is no way of demonstrating that one particular explanation is correct, so in
this paper we perform various tests to determine whether our hypothesis is
plausible. We begin by asking what combination of loss aversion and evaluation
period would be necessary to explain the historical pattern of returns. For our
model of individual decision making we use the recent updated version of
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) for which the authors have
provided parameters that can be considered as describing the representative
4decision maker. We then ask, how often would an investor with this set of
preferences have to be evaluating his portfolio in order to be indifferent between
the historical distribution of returns on stocks and bonds? Although we do this
several ways (with both real and nominal returns, and comparing stocks with both
bonds and treasury bills) the answers we obtain are all in the neighborhood of I
year (from 9 to 13 months?), clearly a plausible result. We then take the one
year evaluation period as given and ask what asset allocation (that is, what
combination of stocks and bonds) would be optimal for such an investor. Again
we obtain a plausible result: close to 50-50 split between stocks and bonds.
As a final test of the theory, we ask whether myopic loss aversion can
provide an explanation for another well known asset pricing anomaly, the size
effect (Banz, 1981; Keim, 1983). Why have small firms earned returns so much
higher than large firms over the last 65 years? In this case there are two
aggregation issues that must be incorporated into the model: the evaluation
period and whether stock returns are evaluated individually or as components of
a portfolio. We find that if investors have the evaluation periods consistent with
the historical equity premium, then the size effect can be explained by myopic
loss aversion if investors evaluate stock returns one stock at a time.
2. Is the EquIty Premium Puzzle Real?
Before we set out to provide an answer to an alleged puzzle, we should
probably rview the evidence about whether there is indeed a puzzle to explain.
We address this question in two ways. First, we ask whether the post 1926 time
period studied by Merha and Prescott is special. Then we review the other
explanations that have been offered. As any insightful reader might guess from
the fact that we have written this paper, we conclude that the puzzle is real and
that the existing explanations come up short.
5The robustness of the equity premium has been addressed by Jeremy
Siegel (1991, 1992) who examines the returns since 1802. He finds that real
equity returns have been remarkably stable. For example, over the three time
periods 1802.1870, 1871-1925, and 1926-1990, real compound equity returns
were 5.7, 6.6, and 6.4 percent. However, returns on short-term government
bonds have fallen dramatically, the figures for the same three time periods being
5.1, 3.1, and 0.5 percent. Thus, there was no equity premium in the first two
thirds of the 19th century (because bond returns were high) but over the last 120
years, stocks have had a significant edge. The equity premium does not appear
to be a recent phenomenon.
The advantage of investing in stocks over the period 1876 to 1990 is
documented in a rather different way by Thomas MaCurdy and John Shoven
(1992). They look at the historical evidence from the point of view of a faculty
member saving for retirement. They assume that 10 percent of the hypothetical
faculty member's salary is invested each year, and ask how the faculty members
would have done investing in portfolios of all stocks or all bonds over their
working lifetimes. They find that faculty who had allocated all of their funds to
stocks would have done better in virtually every time period, usually by a large
margin. For working lifetimes of only 25 years, all bond portfolios occasionally do
better (e.g., for those retiring in a couple years during the mid 1930's and early
1940's) though never by more than 20 percent. In contrast, those in all stock
portfolios often do better by very large amounts. Also, all 25-year careers since
1942 would have been better off in all stocks. For working lifetimes of 40 years,
there is not a single case in which the all bond portfolio wins (though there is a
virtual tie for those retiring in 1942), and for those retiring in the late 1950's and
early 1960's, stock accumulators would have more than seven times more than
bond accumulators. MaCurdy and Shoven conclude from their analysis that
6people must be "confused about the relative safety of different investments over
long horizons." (p. 12)
Could the large equity premium be consistent with rational expected utility
maximization models of economic behavior? Mehra and Prescott's contribution
was to show that risk aversion alone is unlikely to yield a satisfactory answer.
They found that people would have to have a coefficient of relative risk aversion
over 30 to explain the historical pattern of returns. In interpreting this number, it
is useful to remember that a logarithmic function has a coefficient of relative risk
aversion of 1.0. Also, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) provide the following useful
calculation. Suppose an individual is offered a gamble with a 50 percent chance
of consumption of $100,000 and a 50 percent chance of consumption of $50,000.
A person with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 30 would be indifferent
between this gamble and a certain consumption of $51,209. Few people can be
this afraid of risk.
Previous efforts to provide alternative explanations for the puzzle have
been, at most, only partly successful. For example, Reitz (1988) argued that the
equity premium might be the rational response to a time varying risk of economic
catastroph.e. While this explanation has the advantage of being untestable, its
does not seem plausible. (See Mehra and Prescott's 1988 reply.) First of all, the
data since 1926 do contain the crash of 1929, so the catastrophe in question
must be of much greater magnitude than that. Second, the hypothetical
catastrophe must affect stocks and not bonds. For example, a bout of
hyperinflation would presumably hurt bonds more than stocks.
Another line of research has aimed at relaxing the link between the
coefficient of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
which are inverses of each other in the standard discounted expected utility
framework. For example, Well (1989) introduces Kreps-Porteus non-expected
7utility preferences, but finds that the equity premium puzzle simply becomes
transformed into a "risk free rate puzzle". That is, the puzzle is no longer why are
stock returns so high, but rather why are t-bilI rates so low. Epstein and Zin
(1990) also adopt a non-expected utility framework using Yaari's (1987) "dual"
theory of choice. Yaari's theory shares some features with the version of
prospect theory that we employ below (namely a rank dependent approach to
probability weights) but does not have loss aversion or short horizons, the two
key components of our explanation. Epstein and Zin find that their model can
only explain about one third of the observed equity premium. Similarly, Mankiw
and Zeldes (1991) investigate whether the homogeneity assumptions necessary
to aggregate across consumers could be the source of the puzzle. They point
out that a minority of Americans hold stock, and their consumption patterns differ
from non-stock holders. However, they conclude that while these differences can
explain a part of the equity premium, a significant puzzle remains.
An alternative type of explanation is suggested by Constantinides (1990).
He proposes a habit formation model in which the utility of consumption is
assumed to depend on past levels of consumption. Specifically, consumers are
assumed to be averse to reductions in their level of consumption. Constantinides
shows that this type of model can explain the equity premium puzzle. However,
Ferson and Constantinides (1991) find that while the habit formation specification
improves the ability of the model to explain the intertemporal dynamics of returns,
it does not help the model explain the differences in average returns across
assets.
While Constantinides is on the right track in stressing an asymmetry
between gains and losses, we feel that his model does not quite capture the right
behavioral intuitions. The problem is that the link between stock returns and
consumption is quite tenuous. The vast majority of Americans hold no stocks
8outside their pension wealth. Furthermore, most pensions are of the defined
benefit variety, meaning that a fall in stock prices is inconsequential to the
pension beneficiaries. Indeed, most of the stock market is owned by three
groups of investors: pension funds, endowments, and very wealthy individuals.
It is hard to see why the habit formation model should apply to these investors.3
3. Prospect theory and loss aversion
The problem with the habit formation explanation is the stress it places on
consumption. The way to incorporate Constantinides' intuition about behavior
into preferences is to assume that investors have preferences over returns, per
se, rather than over the consumption profile that the returns help provide. One
way to do this is to use Kahneman and Tverskys (1979, 1992) prospect theory in
which utility is defined over gains and losses (i.e., returns) rather than levels of
wealth. Specifically, they propose a value function of the following form:
v(x) = if x￿0
(1)
if x<0
where ?.. is the coefficient of loss aversion. They have estimated cx and 13 to be
0.88 and A. to be 2.25. Notice that the notion of loss aversion captures the same
intuition that Constantinides used, namely that reductions are painful.4
The value of a gamble, G, which pays off Xi with probability p1 is given by
3 We Stress the word should in the previous sentence. Firmsmay adopt accounting rules with
regard to their pension wealth which create a sensitivity to short run fluctuations in pension fund
assets, and foundations may have spending rules that produce a similar effect. An investigation
of this issue is presented below.
4 This value of XIs consistent with other measures of loss aversion estimated invery different
contexts. For example, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) investigate the importance of
loss aversion in a purely deterministic context. For example, in one experiment half of a group of
Cornell students Is given a Cornell Insignia coffee mug while the other half of the subjects are not
given a mug. Then, markets are conducted for the mugs in which mug owners can sell their mug
while the non-owners can buy one. KKT found that the reservation prices for two groups were
significantly different. SpecIfically, the median reservation price of the sellers was roughly 2.5
times the median reservation price of the buyers.
9V(G) = ltj V(Xj)
where ltj is the decision weight associated assigned to outcome i. In the original
version of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), it is simple a
nonlinear transform of p. In the cumulative version of the theory (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992), as in other rank-dependent models, one transforms
cumulative rather than individual probabilities. Consequently, the decision weight
it depends on the cumulative distribution of the gamble, not only on pj. More
specifically, let w denote the nonlinear transform of the cumulative distribution of
G, let P be the probability of obtaining an outcome that is at least as good as x,
and let P1 be the probability of obtaining an outcome that is strictly better than x1.
Then the decision weight attached to Xj is ltj = w(P) - w(P*). (This procedure is
applied separately for gains and losses.)




and estimated y to be .61 in the domain of gains and .69 in the domain of losses.
As discussed in the introduction, the use of prospect theory must be
accompanied by a specification of frequency that returns are evaluated. We refer
to the length of time over which an investor aggregates returns as the evaluation
period. This is not, in any way, to be confused with the planning horizon of the
investor. A young investor, for example, might be saving for retirement 30 years
off in the future, but nevertheless experience the utility associated with the gains
and losses of his investment every quarter when he opens a letter from his
mutual fund. In this case his horizon is 30 years but his evaluation period is 3
months.
10That said, in terms of the model an investor with an evaluation period of
one year behaves very much jj he had a planning honzon of one year. To see
this, compare two investors. Mr. X receives a bonus every year on January first
and invests the money to spend on a Christmas vacation the following year.
Both his planning horizon and evaluation period are one year. Ms. Y has received
a bonus and wishes to invest it toward her retirement 30 years away. She
evaluates her portfolio annually. Thus, she has a planning horizon of 30 years
but a one year evaluation period. Though X and V have rather different
problems, in terms of the model they will behave approximately the same way.
The reason for this is that in prospect theory, the carriers of utility are assumed to
be changes in wealth, or returns, and the effect of the level of wealth is assumed
to be second order. Therefore, every year V will solve her asset allocation
problem by choosing the portfolio that maximizes her prospective utility one year
away, just as X does.5 In this sense, when we estimate the evaluation period of
investors below, we are also estimating their implicit time horizons.
Of course, in a model with loss aversion, the more often an investor
evaluates his portfolio, or the shorter his horizon, the less attractive he will find a
high mean, high risk investment such as stocks. This is in contrast to the well-
known results of Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969). They investigate the
following question. Suppose an investor has to choose between stocks and
bonds over some fixed horizon of length T. How should the allocation change as
the horizon increases? There is a strong intuition that a rational risk averse
investor would decrease the proportion of his assets in stocks as T decreases.
The intuition comes from the notion that when T is large, the probability that the
An important potential qualification is if recent gains or losses influence subsequent decisions.
For example, Thaler and Johnson (1990) find evidence for a house money effect. Namely,
people who have lust won some money exhibit less loss aversion toward gambles that do not risk
their entire recent winnings.
11return on stocks will exceed the return on bonds approaches 1.0, while over short
horizons there can be substantial shortfalls from stock investments. However,
Merton and Samuelson show that this intuition is wrong. Specifically, they prove
that as long as the returns on stocks and bonds are a random walk6, a risk
averse investor with a broad range of utility functions (any power function) should
choose the same allocation for any time horizon. An investor who wants mostly
stocks in his portfolio at age 35 should still want the same allocation at age 64. It
is safe to say that most investors find this result extremely counterintuitive. We
hope our investigation here will hope show why.
4. How often are portfolios evaluated?
Mehra and Prescott asked the question, How risk averse would the
representative investor have to be to be indifferent between stocks and bonds?
We ask a different question. If investors have prospect theory preferences, how
often would they have to evaluate their portfolios to make them indifferent
between stocks and bonds? We use simulations to answer this question. The
method is to draw samples from the historical (1 926-1990) monthly returns on
stocks, bonds, and treasury bills provided by CRSP. We then compute the
"prospective utility" (that is, the prospect theory equivalent to expected utility) of
holding stocks and t-bills for evaluation periods varying from 1 to 18 months,
using the parameters mentioned above.
The simulations are conducted as follows. First, distributions of returns
are generated for various time horizons by drawing 10,000 n-month returns (with
replacement) from the CRSP time series. The returns are then ranked, from best
to worst, and the return is computed at 20 intervals along the cumulative
6 If stock returns are instead mean reverting then the Intuitive result that stocks are more
attractive to investors with long horizons holds.
12distribution7. (This is done to accommodate the cumulative or rank dependent
formulation of prospect theory.) Using these data it is possible to compute the
prospect value of the given asset for the specified holding period.
We have done this simulation four different ways. The CRSP stock index
is compared both to treasury bill returns and to 5 year bond returns, and these
comparisons are done both in real and nominal terms. The results are presented
in Figure 1, panels A-D. As the figures show, the horizon at which the
prospective utility for stocks is equal to the value for bonds or treasury bills is
always between 9 and 12 months, or roughly one year.
While we have done all four simulations for the sake of completeness, and
to give the reader the opportunity to examine the robustness of the method, we
feel that the most weight should be assigned to panel D which shows the
comparison between stocks and bonds in nominal returns. Our argument for
using nominal returns is twofold. First, returns are usually reported in nominal
dollars. Even when inflation adjusted returns are calculated, it is the nominal
returns that are given prominence in most annual reports. Therefore, in a
descriptive model, nominal returns should be the assumed units of account.
Second, the simulations reveal that investors would not be willing to hold treasury
bills over any evaluation period as they always yield negative prospective utility
(see panel A).8 As for the choice of t-bills or bonds as the cornparison asset, for
long-term investors bonds seem to be the closer substitute, particularly for
institutional investors. We therefore take as our point estimate of the evaluation
period the result from panel D, 11-12 months.
We have also tried dividing the outcomes into 100 intervals instead of 20 and the results are
substantially the same.
8 This suggests a solution to the frIsk-free rate puzzle employing a combination of framing and
money illusion. In nominal terms, treasury bills offer the illusion of a sure gain which is very
attractive to prospect theory investors, while in real terms treasury bills otter a combination of
barely positive mean returns and a substantial risk of a lqss--not an attractive combination.
13How should these results be interpreted? Obviously, there is no single
evaluation period that applies to every investor. Indeed, even a single investor
may employ a combination of evaluation periods, with casual evaluations every
quarter, a more serious evaluation annually, and evaluations associated with
long-term planning every few years. Nevertheless, if one had to pick a single
most plausible length for the evaluation period, one year might well be the
winner. Individual investors file taxes annually, receive their most comprehensive
reports from their brokers, mutual funds, and retirement accounts once a year,
and institutional investors also take the annual reports most seriously. As a
possible evaluation period, one year is at least highly plausible.
There are two reasonable questions to ask about these results. Which
aspects of prospect theory drive the results, and how sensitive are the results to
alternative specifications? The answer to the first question is that loss aversion is
the main determinant of the outcomes. The specific functional forms of the value
function and weighting functions are not critical. For example, if the weighting
function is replaced by actual probabilities, the evaluation period for which bonds
have the same prospective utility as stocks falls from 11-12 months to 10 months.
Similarly, if actual probabilities are used and the value function is replaced by a
bi-linear form with a loss aversion factor of 2.25 (that is, v(x) = x, x￿0, v(x) = 2.25
x, x < 0) then the equilibrium evaluation period is 8 months. With this model (bi-
linear value function and linear probabilities) a 12 month evaluation period is
consistent with a loss aversion factor of 2.77.
There is another way of looking at the simulation results that provides a
check on the reasonableness of the explanation. Suppose an investor is
maximizing prospective utility with a one year horizon. What mix of stocks and
bonds would be optimal? We investigate this question as follows. We compute
the prospective utility of each portfolio mix between 100 percent bonds and 100
14percent stocks, in 10 percent increments. The results are shown in Figure 2,
using nominal returns. (Again, the results for real returns are similar.) The
optimal portfolio turns out to be about 50 percent stocks. Once again, this result
has the ring of truth to it. For example, consider the participants in TIAA-CREF,
the defined contribution retirement plan at many universities, and the largest of its
kind in the U.S. The most frequent allocation between CREF (stocks) and TIAA
(mostly bonds) is 50-50, with the average allocation to stocks below 50 percent.9
Pension funds managed by corporations adopt similar asset allocation mixes,
with 60 percent stocks being a common observation.
5. Myopia and the Magnitude of the Equity Premium
According to our theory, the equity premium is produced by a combination
of loss aversion and frequent evaluations. Loss aversion plays the role of risk
aversion in standard models, and can be considered a fact of life (or, perhaps, a
fact of preferences). In contrast, the frequency of evaluations is a policy choice
which presumably could be altered, at least in principle. Furthermore, as the
charts in Figure 1 show, stocks become more attractive as the evaluation period
increases. This observation leads to the natural question, By how much would
the equilibrium equity premium fall if the evaluation period increased?
Figure 3 shows the results of an analysis of this issue using real returns on
stocks, and the real returns on 5 year bonds as the comparison asset. With the
parameters we have been using, the actual equity premium in our data (6.5
percent per year) is consistent with an evaluation period of one year. If the
evaluation period were 2 years, the equity premium would fall to 4.65 percent.
For 5, 10, and 20 year evaluation periods, the corresponding figures are 3.0
percent, 2.0 percent, and 1.4 percent. One way to think about these results is
9 See Macurdy and Shoven (1992) for illustrative data.
15that for someone with a 20 year investment horizon, the psychic costs of
evaluating the portfolio annually are 5.1 percent per year! That is, someone with
a 20 year horizon would be indifferent between stocks and bonds if the equity
premium were only 1.4 percent, and the remaining 5.1 percent is potential rents
payable to those who are able to resist the temptation to count their money often.
In a sense, 5.1 percent is the price of excessive vigilance.
6. Do Organizations Display Myopic Loss Aversion?
There is a possible objection to our explanation in that it has been based
on a modei of individual decision making while the bulk of the assets we are
concerned with are held by organizations, in particular pension funds and
endowments. This is a reasonable concern, and our response should help
indicate the way we interpret our explanation.
As we stressed above, the key components of our explanation are loss
aversion and frequent evaluations. While we have used a specific
parameterization of cumulative prospect theory in our simulation tests, we did so
to because we felt that it provided a helpful discipline. We did not allow
ourselves the luxury of selecting the parameters that would fit the data best. That
said, it remains true that almost any model with loss aversion and frequent
evaluations will go a long way toward explaining the equity premium puzzle, so
the right question to ask about organizations is whether they display these traits.
Pension funds
Consider first the important case of defined benefit pension funds. In this,
this most common type of pension plan, the firm promises each vested worker a
pension benefit that is typically a function of final salary and years of service.
For these plans, the firm, not the employees, is the residual claimant. If the
assets in the plan earn a high return, the firm can make smaller contributions to
16the fund in future years, whereas if the assets do not earn a high enough return,
the firms contribution rate will have to increase to satisfy funding regulations.
Although asset allocations vary across firms, a common allocation is about
60 percent stocks and 40 percent bonds and treasury bills. Given the historical
equity premium, and the fact that pension funds have essentially an infinite time
horizon, it is a bit puzzling why pension funds do not invest a higher proportion in
stocks.'° We argue that myopic loss aversion offers an explanation. In this
context the myopic loss aversion is produced by an agency problem.
While the pension is indeed likely to exist as long as the company
remains in business (baring a plan termination) the pension fund manager (often
the corporate treasurer, CFO, or staff member who reports to the CFO) does not
expect to be in this job forever. He or she will have to make regular reports on
the funding level of the pension plan and the returns on the funds assets. This
short horizon creates a conflict of interest between the pension fund manager
and the stockholders. This view appears to be shared by two prominent Wall
Street advisors. In Leibowitz and Langetieg (1989) the authors make numerous
calculations regarding the long-term results of various asset allocation decisions.
They conclude as follows. "If we limit our choice to 'stocks' and 'bonds' as
represented by the S&P 500 and the BIG Index, then under virtually any
reasonable set of assumptions, stocks will almost surely outperform bonds as the
investment horizon is extended to infinity. Unfortunately, most of us do not have
an infinite period of time to work out near term losses. Most investors and
investment managers set personal investment goals that must be achieved in
time frames of 3 to 5 years. . ."(p. 14) Also, when discussing simulation results
10 See Fischer Black (1980) for a different point of view. He argues that pension funds should
be invested entirely in bonds because of tax arbitrage opportunity. However, his position rests on
the efficient market premise that there is no equity premium puzzle, that is, return on stocks is just
enough to compensate for the risk.
17for 20 year horizons under so-called favorable assumptions, (e.g., that the
historic equity premium and mean reversion in equity returns will continue) they
offer the following remarks. "[Our analysis] shows that, under 'favorable
assumptions, the stock/bond [return] ratio will exceed 100% most of the time.
However, for investors who must account for near term losses, these long-run
results may have little significance." (p. 15, emphasis added) In other words,
agency costs produce myopic loss aversion.11
Foundation and University Endowments
Another important group of institutional investors is endowment funds held
by universities and foundations. Once again, an even split between stocks and
bonds is common although the endowment funds are explicitly treated as
perpetuities. In this case, however, there appear to be two causes for the myopic
loss aversion. First, there are agency problems similar to those for pension
plans. Consider a foundation with 50 percent of its assets invested in stocks.
Suppose the president of the foundation wanted to increase the allocation to 100
percent, arguing that with an infinite horizon, stocks are almost certain to
outperform bonds. Again the president will face the problem that his horizon is
distinctly finite as are the horizons of his board members. In fact, there is really
no one represents the interests of foundation's potential beneficiaries in the 22nd
century. This is art agency problem without a principal!
An equally important source of myopic loss aversion comes from the
spending rules used by most universities and foundations. A typical rule
specifies that the organization can spend x percent of an n-year moving average
of the value of the endowment, where n is typically five or less.12 Although the
11 Of course, many observers have accused American firms of myopia. The pension asset
allocation decision may be a useful domain for measuring firms' horizons. Daniel Kahneman and
Thaler plan further work investigating these issues.
12 Foundations also have minimum spending rules which they have to obey to retain their tax-
free status.
18purpose of such moving averages is to smooth out the impact of stock market
fluctuations, a sudden drop or a long bear market can have a pronounced effect
on spending. The institution is forced to choose between the competing goals of
maximizing the present value of spending over an infinite horizon, and
maintaining a steady operating budget. The fact that stocks have outperformed
bonds over every 20 year period in history is cold comfort after a decade of zero
nominal returns, an experience most institutions still remember.
There is an important difference between universities (and operating
foundations) and individuals saving for retirement. For an individual saving for
retirement, it can be argued that the only thing she should care about is the size
of the annuity that can be purchased at retirement, i.e., terminal wealth.
Transitory fluctuations impose only psychic costs. For universities and operation
foundations, however, there is both a psychic cost to seeing the value of the
endowment fall and the very real cost of cutting back programs if there is a cash
flow reduction for a period of years. However, this in no way diminishes the force
of the myopic loss aversion explanation for the equity premium. If anything the
argument is strengthened by the existence of economic factors contributing to
loss aversion. Nevertheless, institutions could probably do better at structuring
their spending rules to facilitate a higher exposure to risky assets.13
7. Myopic Loss Aversion and the Size Effect
Of course it is never possible to establish that any explanation for a
phenomenon is correct. One useful step is to examine the implications of a
particular explanation of a phenomenon and see if they seem reasonable and
plausible. That is what we have done so far here. Another type of test is to see
whether the same theory can explain other unrelated phenomenon. If so, the
13 In some calculations made on behalf of one operating foundation, we found that a 9 year
moving average was best if we assumed that they were loss averse in spending.
19theory should gain credibility. In this vein we report here some preliminary tests
of myopic loss aversion as an explanation for the size effect.
Just as stocks have outperformed bonds by a surprisingly large amount
over the CRSP time period since 1926, similarly, stocks of small firms have
outperformed the stocks of large firms by an equally impressive margin.
Although it is tempting to attribute the high returns to risk, excess returns remain
after controlling for beta, and simply calling size a "risk factor" does not, in and of
itself, offer much in the way of explanation. Before we can confidently attribute
the high returns of small firms to risk we should be able to say more about what
the nature of this risk is. Prospect theory offers an alternative way of measuring
risk that might serve this role.
The question then is how to apply our cumulative prospect theory
apparatus to the small firm effect. The first thing to notice is about this problem is
that two levels of aggregation apply. As with the asset allocation problem, we
first must specify the evaluation period over which investors compute their
returns, but then we must also specify how stock returns are coded. That is, do
investors evaluate their portfolios security by security, or asset class by asset
class? With so many degrees of freedom it would be easy enough to find some
formulation that fits the data, so we restrict ourselves as follows. First, we
assume that in evaluating stock returns, investors use the "equilibrium"
evaluation period estimated above which, for nominal returns, was about 12
months. Then, using this evaluation period, we ask what aggregation rules would
lead to the prospective utility of small stock purchases to be equal to the value of
large stock purchases.
We began by taking the monthly returns from all stocks in the smallest and
largest deciles (ranked by market value of equity) on the CRSP tape from 1926-
1990. The next step depended on the evaluation period being used. In the
20case of 12 month evaluation periods, we partitioned the sample one year
intervals. Then for every stock in the two deciles that had returns for aU 12
months14, we computed an 12 month nominal return. We then formed portfolios
of n stocks, where n varied from 1-10. We did this by first picking one of the
years at random, and then picking n of the large stocks and n of the small stocks
(with replacement). This process (of first picking a time period at random, and
then picking stock returns for large and small stocks from that time period) was
repeated 10,000 times for each portfolio size. We then computed the prospective
utility for each size portfolio the same way we did above.
The results of one such simulation are shown in Figure 4. As the figure
shows, for portfolios of more than five stocks, the prospective utilities of both
large stock and small stock portfolios flatten out, with the value of small stocks
being much higher than for large stocks, consistent with the size effect.
However, as the portfolios approach a single stock, the curves come together.
Of special interest is the finding that the prospective utility of a single small stock
is virtually identical to the prospective utility of a portfolio of large stocks. This
result suggests the following interpretation. Small stocks are held primarily by
individual investors, and so the small firm premium depends on their preferences.
Individual investors tend to evaluate their stock purchases one stock at a time,
rather than as a portfolio. Furthermore, they may compare the purchase of a
single small stock with a portfolio of large stocks (i.e., a mutual fund). We
conclude that myopic loss aversion offers some promise as an explanation for
the size effect.
14 This method introduces a small survivorship bias since we required 12 months of consecutive
returns. The results should not be materially affected.
218. ConclusIons
The equity premium j a puzzle within the standard expected utility
maximizing paradigm. As Mehra and Prescott forcefully argue, it seems
impossibleto reconcile the high rates of return on stocks with the very low risk
free rate. How can investors be extremely unwilling to accept vanatioris in
returns, as the equity premium implies, and yet be willing to delay consumption to
earn a measly 1 percent per year? Our solution to the puzzle is to combine a
high sensitivity to losses with a prudent tendency to frequently monitor ones
wealth. The latter tendency shifts the domain of the utility function from
consumption to returns, and the former makes people demand a large premium
to accept return variability. In our model investors are unwilling to accept return
variability even if the short run returns have no effect on consumption.
In their reply to Reitz, Mehra and Prescott (1988) offer the following
guidelines for what they think would constitute a solution to the equity premium
puzzle. "Perhaps the introduction of some other preference structure will do the
job. . . . For such efforts to be successful, though, they must convince the
profession that the proposed alternative preference structure is more useful than
the now-standard one for organizing and interpreting not only these observations
on average asset returns, but also other observations in growth theory, business
cycle theory, labor market behavior, and so on." (p. 134) While prospect theory
has not yet been applied in all the contexts Mehra and Prescott cite, it has been
extensively tested and supported in the study of decision making under
uncertainty, and loss aversion appears to offer promise as a component of an
explanation for unemployment15 and for understanding the outcomes in many
15 For example, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) find that perceptions of fairness in labor
market contexts are strongly influenced by whether actions are framed as imposing losses or
reducing gains.
22legal contexts.16 This evidence, combined with the tentative results on the size
effect, suggest that myopic loss aversion deserves some consideration as a
possible solution to Mehra and Prescotts fascinating puzzle.
16 See Hovenkamp (1991) and Cohen and Knetsch (19x).
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